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The Universal Credit fiasco shows that we need a new model
of Ministerial accountability
The Government’s Universal Credit scheme looks to be unravelling, with the Public Accounts Committee
recently levelling a series of withering criticisms at the Department for Work and Pensions. Dave
Richards and Martin Smith argue that the Secretary of State’s decision to pin the blame for these failures on
his departmental officials marks the culmination of a long term blurring of established lines of accountability.
The authors argue that Britain need a new version of the “Haldane Principle”, fit for the 21st Century, to clarify
who takes the blame when things go wrong. 
The current imbroglio
surrounding the
Universal Credit scheme appears to be another example of  what Crewe and King have recently identif ied as
a long line of  policy blunders in the UK.  The accusations being levelled at Iain Duncan Smith and his
department are serious.  They illustrate both problems of  implementation and reoccurring questions
surrounding accountability.   As the Public Accounts Committee’s report (November 2013) into the rolling-
out of  the scheme bluntly states:
Management of the Universal Credit programme has been extraordinarily poor. Oversight has
been characterised by a failure to understand properly the nature and enormity of the task, a
failure to monitor and challenge progress regularly, and a failure to intervene promptly when
problems arose. Senior managers only became aware of problems through ad hoc reviews,
mostly conducted by external reviewers, as inadequate management information and reporting
arrangements had not alerted them that things were amiss.
What is particularly concerning about this af f air is that it can be seen as another illustration of  a deepening
institutional malaise in the Brit ish polit ical system and adds to the growing distrust f elt by cit izens towards
the polit ical elite.  It also highlights what appears to be an increasingly antagonistic relationship between
ministers and senior Whitehall of f icials, in which both are willing to publicly indulge in some pretty unsavoury
f inger-pointing.  The scale of  the issue has accelerated throughout the period of  the Coalit ion
government.  Various spats attest to the growing distrust between ministers and of f icials (f or details see
the 2013 Public Administration Select Committee’s report “Truth to Power“). It is a f ar cry f rom the original
tenets underpinning the minister-civil servant relationship established by the 1918 Haldane Report which
af f irmed a principle already prescribed by Northcote-Trevelyan that the relationship between ministers and
of f icials should be intrinsically linked:
The Government of the country [cannot] be carried out without the aid of an efficient body of
permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the ministers who are
directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence,
character, ability and experience to be able to advise, assist, and to some extent, influence
those who are from time to time set over them.
On this basis, the Brit ish system of  government is seen to embody a system not of  f ormally codif ied rules
but instead advice -  determined by the constitutional principle that [Prime] Ministers act as advisers to the
sovereign, having in turn been advised by civil servants. This was based on the convention that of f icials are
in a posit ion to advise a minister on a subject (f ree f rom the threat of  f ear or f avour) and as such, there is
no requirement f or the separation of  power between the polit ical and administrative class. This is the
antithesis of  the US ’Wilsonian model’ or many other European models of  government that are premised on
more pluralistic sentiments and a separation of  powers.
Constitutionally then, the Haldane convention does not recognise any division in the personality of
ministers and their of f icials. This principle of  both indivisibility and mutual dependence within the UK system
is seen as providing both a practical and constitutional constraint to protect against the arbitrary (ab)use
of  power. This convention became a bedrock of  the Westminster model.  It established the modus
operandi that of f icials and ministers should operate in a symbiotic relationship whereby ministers decide
af ter consultation with their of f icials whose wisdom, institutional memory and knowledge of  the processes
of  governing helps to guide the minister.  The of f icial is loyal to the minster who takes the rap when things
go wrong.  Whatever the problems with this approach, democratic or otherwise, it at least outlined clear
lines of  responsibility and accountability.
Ministers were the ones held to account even if  they of ten evaded the responsibility. Of  course, scratch
below the surf ace and the constitutional niceties of  the minister-civil servant relationship have of  course
proved at t imes f ractious.  The Wilson Government’s suspicion and crit icism of  Whitehall moved it to
establish Fulton, although inf amously of  course the Haldane principle was lef t strictly of f - limits.  Heath’s
re-organisations in the early 1970s was an asserted attempt at ministerial muscle f lexing, but Whitehall was
not shy in kicking-back.  The Benn side-show during the 1970’s Labour Government of f ered some
entertaining spats when f irst in Industry, then in Energy, he challenged the standard operating procedures
within  Whitehall, so boo-hooing  Haldane. But beyond these skirmishes, it is really only since the 1980s,
that the Haldane model has been gradually, and largely implicit ly, undermined.
This has coincided with the rise, and f urther rise, of  the cult of  managerialism which has seen ministers
over the last thirty years constantly challenge civil servants about their managerial and policy skills, led
them to seek to diversif y their sources of  policy advice and shif t of f icials f rom a policy role to a more
managerial role.  In so doing, Haldane’s somewhat mythical depiction of  minster-civil servant symbiosis has
crumbled, as ministers have sort to use outsiders both in relation to making and delivering policy.
In terms of  current plans f or civil service ref orm, the Coalit ion is continuing this trend, seeking out ways to
move towards greater open policy-making, so f urther eroding Whitehall’s monopoly on policy advice. But
while these changes are being acted out, mainly in a piecemeal and ad hoc way, there is no attempt to
rethink how this af f ects accountability.  Of f icials have increasingly been placed in a managerial role, while
policy advice has been ever more polit icised.  This creates a major tension in government.
Of f icials have less responsibility in designing policy but take more blame when things go wrong because it
is increasingly seen as their responsibility to manage the delivery of  policies.  And of  course, the problem
f or of f icials is that where f ailure occurs – be it with Universal Credit, or bef ore it the Child Support Agency,
the Individual Learning Account scheme, the Assets Recovery Agency, the Immigration Directorate [and so
on] – each case starts with what appears to be a rational and technocratic policy change which becomes
polit icised and hence entraps the of f icials in highly polit ical decision making.
Yet when PASC, in the af orementioned report above, made but one recommendation that: ‘Parliament
should establish a Joint Committee of  both Houses to sit as a Commission on the f uture of  the Civil
Service’, it received short-shrif t f rom the Government.   And so here, stasis over this vexed issue has taken
hold in the shape of  of f icial resistance to openly debate and clarif y the changing role and posit ion of  the
civil service. The problem is that ref orm is happening without f ull transparency.  Polit icians have a dual
discourse in relation to the civil service: on one hand, Whitehall is an organisation of  of ten outstanding and
committed public servants; on the other, it can be a conservative and at t imes, poorly- trained body
unprepared f or the modern requirements of  project management and with litt le experience of  the real world.
The Coalit ion, rhetorically at least, is committed to what it sees as ‘open policy making’, where decisions
are open to scrutiny and a whole range of  groups and individuals have access to the policy process.  Yet
the reality is that polit icians want advice that conf irms rather than challenges their world view and so are
reluctant to truly embrace a transparent, open and pluralistic policy-making environment.   Instead, what
occurs are a whole range of  dif f erent and of ten incoherent ref orms to the policy process without any
explicit discussion of  the over-arching nature of  the minister-civil service relationship, including f or example:
What is the modern day role and relationship of  ministers and of f icials?
How do other groups and individuals access the policy process?
What is the nature of  that access and most importantly who is accountable f or policy decisions?
Is policy advice becoming increasingly polit icised?
What seems to have occurred with the Universal Credit debacle is that responsibility is laid at the f eet of
those involved in implementing the policy and not those who designed and approved the policy.  This is
because there is on-going obf uscation over where responsibility and accountability lies. Underlying all of
these issues are some f undamental questions about the Brit ish constitution.  At bottom is the persistence
of  a nineteenth century model of  governing, created when Britain was a world power with litt le internal
capability.  Nothcote-Trevelyan established the principles of  the civil service in 1854, Haldane clarif ied them
at the start of  the twentieth-century and these same principles still ostensibly determine the f ormal role of
of f icials today.
However, the reality of  almost thirty years of  public sector ref orm is that the civil service and with it the
wider policy-making arena are today very dif f erent f rom the nineteenth century model. But there is
reluctance by the governing class to seek to clarif y the changing nature of  the role and relationship of
ministers and of f icials.  Ministers cling on to the Westminster model because it legit imises their power as
decision makers, even as they undermine its practice. Britain’s uncodif ied constitution is meant to be
f lexible but it is only f lexible to those who have power.  For those outside, it continues to mystif y the
process of  change and means that we can undergo ref orms in the process of  governing without any real
transparency.
PASC is right to demand that we ef f ectively need a new Haldane to f it the material reality of  twenty f irst
century governing.  The problem is who is going to lead on this?
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